









ABSTRACT: This study used personal and telephone interviews of wine
industry executives and observers to examine the foreign direct invest-
ment motivations of U.S. wineries. Underlying most winery motiva-
tions was the recognition that U.S. wineries sense increasing pressure to
offer a competitive range of wines that meet the price/quality needs of
consumers and retailers in important markets and market segments.
Wineries’ marketing plans are often constrained by their ability to
obtain adequate grape and juice supplies that meet important price and
quality criteria, especially when domestic grape production drops. The
importance of product portfolios and the industry’s resource depen-
dence have placed tremendous pressures on U.S. wineries to coordinate
winegrape and juice acquisitions, especially as retailers consolidate
their supply chains. Some U.S. wineries have invested abroad in response
to these pressures while others have not. Interview results suggest that
foreign investments by U.S. wineries were primarily motivated by the
need for greater access to stable or adequate winegrape/juice supplies,
the need for more control over the winegrape costs within given quality
levels, and the desire to expand wine portfolios.
INTRODUCTION
Foreign investments by U.S.-based wineries are not a new phenomenon, nor are
they unique among U.S. agricultural ﬁrms (Bolling, DeBraal, and Handy, 1993).
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represented an important reaction to changes in the competitive environment of
world and U.S. wine markets. Much of the increased investment activity occurred
despite signiﬁcant declines in world wine consumption and production. Thus,
foreign investment decisions most likely represented responses to shifting
consumer demand, and increased domestic and international competition rather
than overall growth in the industry. Foreign investments may also reﬂect
wineries’reaction to retail level efforts to create and strengthen supply chains built
around a few wineries that offer a wider portfolio of wines.
The purpose of this study was to examine the foreign direct investment (FDI)
motivations of U.S. wineries that have and have not invested in foreign
operations, and to compare wine industry responses with motivations presented in
the literature on FDI. Opinions about ﬁrms’ FDI motivations were obtained
through a series of personal and telephone interviews with wine industry
executives, consultants, industry publication editors, and government ofﬁcials.
Interviews were conducted with winery executives whose ﬁrms invested in
operations abroad, and with those whose ﬁrms continue to concentrate their
investments and production in the U.S.
One limitation of this approach was that proprietary investment data and
current investment plans could not be presented. Thus, investment motivations
presented in this study represent general motivational themes identiﬁed by at least
two industry executives. These motivations and ﬁgures should not be attributed to
any individual winery. Firm names are used in this study only when company
information was gathered from published sources.
MOTIVATIONS FOUND IN THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT LITERATURE
An overall goal of supply chain management (SCM) is the reduction of
transactions costs within the system that moves and transforms goods from
producers’ raw commodities to ﬁnal consumer products. Given the apparent
advantages, the wine industry is an active participant in the adoption of SCM
principles, and foreign investments are a manifestation of wineries efforts to
remain competitive. Geene, Heijbroek, Lagerwerf, and Wazir (1999, p. 30) noted
that “The appearance of large-scale companies, with their brands and their need
for broad retail distribution, was a perfect response to retailers’ need for
recognizable brands and fewer, but larger suppliers.” For several U.S. wineries,
FDI has become the preferred method for coordinating the acquisition and sale of
wine and winegrapes internationally. Informational asymmetries, asset speciﬁcity,
delayed product differentiation, and the increasing globalization of wine supplies
may all play roles in motivating U.S. wineries to invest overseas, but access to
retail markets is critical.
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1996; Horst, 1972; Grubaugh, 1987; and Pugel, 1981), have suggested that FDI
can be motivated by ﬁrms’ desires to internalize operations or activities that
formerly were carried out in intermediate markets. Dunning reported that ﬁrms
used FDI as part of a strategy to capitalize on capabilities not shared by
competitors. In separate studies, Ray (1990), Markusen (1995), and Trevino and
Daniels (1996) found that ﬁrm size, industry concentration, risk minimization, and
prior export experience were positive inﬂuences on ﬁrms’ FDI decisions. Analysis
by Benito and Gripsrud (1995) suggested that FDI is a signiﬁcant step in a ﬁrm’s
internationalization process because it frequently is used to consolidate or
generate a ﬁrm’s resource base. Furthermore, Craig and Douglas (1996), and Yu
(1986) have observed that decisions to invest abroad, though reversible, are
evolutionary and sequential in nature.
Similarly, Ferdows (1997), Morrison and Ofﬁcer (1992), and Wesson (1994)
identiﬁed three basic FDI motivation categories for ﬁrms that ﬁt nicely in a supply
chain framework. The ﬁrst group addresses the exploitation of a ﬁrm’s tangible
and intangible competitive advantages abroad. The second category views FDI as
part of a ﬁrm’s strategic actions in imperfectly competitive international markets,
which could include actions taken to avoid trade barriers. The third set of
motivations focuses on gaining access to critical assets/inputs in foreign markets.
While all three types of FDI motivations ﬁt within the general context of SCM
considerations, the strategic-action and asset-access categories ﬁt especially well.
The initial application of FDI considerations found in the literature suggest that
U.S. wineries may be motivated by pressures to innovate, to meet differing
consumer needs, to reduce transactions costs, and to stabilize access to quality
wine or winegrapes—and all these pressures provide sufﬁcient motivation for
wineries to utilize SCM practices. Their motivations for using FDI as a primary
means of SCM, however, are not as apparent. The use of FDI no doubt reﬂects
wineries’ assessments of their desires and capacities to broaden the scope of their
activities and intensify their business relationships in other economies, but the
selection of FDI over other means needs further explanation. As a result, an initial
set of opening questions based on current FDI/SCM themes was developed and
used to begin FDI discussions with industry leaders. A copy of the initial
questions is contained in the Appendix.
The shift in U.S. winery investment activity during the 1990s has raised interest
in determining what motivates wineries to invest in non-U.S. wine and vineyard
operations. Handy (1993) and Koechlin (1992) suggest that investment decisions
reﬂect strategic considerations about the current and future actions of domestic
and foreign competitors, and each ﬁrm’s assessment of its ability to react to those
threats. However, strategic production considerations are especially sensitive to
the geographic contexts within which they arise. Consumers use production
location, largely, to identify wines and make initial assessments of product
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production ﬂexibility and improved access to consistent supplies were the primary
motivations for international investments. Because of the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
location, the following brief overview of wine geography serves to open the
discussion of world wine market factors within which FDI motivations arise.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF WINE
Most winegrape production is contained between the latitudes of 30°N and 50°N,
and 30°S and 40°S, but so, too, is nearly all agricultural production (Dickenson,
1990, 1992; and de Blij, 1983). Technological advances and changing consumer/
market needs have opened many winemaking areas. The belief that the best wines
only come from high latitudes, poor soils, difﬁcult terrain, and stressing climates
(the notion of terrior) is, in part, true, but its primacy has been tested by any
number of exceptions known collectively as “New World” wines.
1 The institu-
tionalization of these biases through regulations, such as the appellation contro ˆle ´e
that specify wine-growing regions, grape varieties, and cultivation practices, has
played a role in limiting recognition of New World wine regions. However, these
regulations have also hindered the current market and investment prospects of
wineries bound by their authority by limiting the introduction of quality
improving technology or practices, and use of grapes grown outside speciﬁed
regions (Kraft, 1996).
While environmental factors play a role in wine quality, the inﬂuence of these
factors is not absolute—especially in wines that compete in lower price
categories. Grape quality is an unquestioned essential element in wine making
(grape quality may inﬂuence up to 95% of wine quality), but the application of
appropriate technology can overcome some natural ﬂaws. It was apparent in
interviews with several winery executives that experimentation and innovation, as
opposed to tradition, were considered keys to future commercial success and
consistent product quality.
Finally, though national identities help organize much of the remaining
discussion of world wine markets, consumers’ preferences are increasingly
deﬁned in terms of price and brand information. Geography remains an important
consideration for consumers of high-priced wines, but its signiﬁcance to wine
companies arises more out of production risk reduction and cost considerations,
especially for brands in competitive price categories. Thus, despite data limita-
tions that restrict the discussion of wine production and consumption to a national
level, the production and marketing actions of companies’ should be considered
paramount as it is their actions that most heavily affect world wine markets.
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In addition to geographic characteristics, quality in the world wine market is
segmented by price. As with location, a wine’s price range does not necessarily
guarantee quality, but it remains a critical factor around which wineries and
marketers develop their wine portfolios. Geene et al. (1999) note that the market
for “great” wines, which includes “ultra premium” wines (priced from $14 to $50
per bottle) and “icon” wines (priced above $50 per bottle) only account for about
six percent of worldwide wine volume. In contrast, “super-premium” (priced from
$7 to $14 per bottle) and “premium” (priced from $5 to $7 per bottle) represent
the growing “quality” segment of world wine markets that account for about 44%
of world wine volume. Most of the contraction in wine supply has come from the
“basic” wine category (priced under $5 per bottle), though it still represents about
half of the world’s wine supply. Given the shift away from high volume/low value
wines basic wine production and sales, much of the wine industry’s recent
consolidation has been driven by ﬁrms’ desires to acquire quality wine brands
(Walker, 1999).
As shown in Table 1, the world wine market remains centered in Europe with
the European Union (EU) accounting for over 60% of all wine production and
45% of world wine consumption. In 1997, Europe’s traditional wine producing
nations also accounted for two-thirds of world wine exports. However, Europe’s
production and export shares declined since 1992 by 6% and 10%, respectively.
The ten-year trends for global wine production and consumption have been
heavily inﬂuenced by the EU’s “Wine-Lake” reduction policies. Moulton (1997)
noted that since 1990, world wine production decreased by almost a quarter to an
Table 1. Selected Wine Statistics for Major Wine Producing Nations











France 53.6 900.8 14.9 60.2
Italy 50.8 913.8 12.5 59.4
Spain 33.9 1,155.0 8.6 37.9
United States 20.2 314.8 2.3 7.2
Argentina 13.5 208.8 1.3 41.6
South Africa 8.7 108.0 — 9.5
Germany 8.5 104.8 2.2 23.1
Romania 6.7 254.1 — 31.4
Australia 6.2 89.8 2.7 18.2
Portugal 5.7 259.8 2.4 58.3
Chile 4.5 131.9 3.6 15.9
Hungary 4.5 131.1 — 29.9
World 259.6 7,813.5 60.8 —
Source: Doering (pp. 48, 50), and Wine Business Monthly, (p. 27)
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(1999) indicated that by 1997, world wine production had increased slightly to
about 260 million hectoliters. Most of the production declines occurred in basic
wines, while quality wine production increased. As noted by Doering (1999), EU
policies aimed at lowering the “Wine Lake” worked. These policies, which
diverted lower-quality wines from southern France and Italy, and central Spain
into ethanol production, and paid growers to pull marginal vineyards, led to
acreage reductions in all three countries. As overall production has declined,
global consumption also decreased by 21% to an average of 225 million
hectoliters in the 1997. Most of this decline has taken place in European nations,
where per capita wine consumption dropped because of demographic, and
lifestyle changes. For example, French per capita wine consumption declined
from 79.9 liters in 1989 to 60.2 liters in 1997, and Italian consumption dropped
from 67.0 liters in 1989 to 59.4 in 1997.
As production and consumption declined and converged, global exports
increased 33% to about 61 million hectoliters. Trade is an essential part of the
world wine market, and as demonstrated by the increased value of wine exports,
the trade is in quality wines. On average, about a quarter of world production is
exported. In contrast, the U.S. wine industry exports about 11% of its production.
However, export wine sales from the U.S. have increased by over 20% per year
since 1995 (Walker, 1998).
Although traditional European wine producing nations remain the world’s
dominant exporters, their market shares have fallen as New World wine producers
have gained market share. The 10% increase in the share of world wine exports
held by New World wineries is evidence of the inroads these wineries have made
in world markets. These gains may also have served as a positive signal for
potential investors. Among New World wine-producers, in 1997, Chile was the
largest exporter, with a 31% market share of New World wine exports. Australia
was the second largest New World wine exporter with a 26% share. The U.S. and
Argentina followed with respective New World shares of 20 and 13%.
A common element in most developed wine markets has been the increased
inﬂuence of wine marketers. Geene et al. note that as retailers develop their wine
supply chains their preference for dealing with a few consistent suppliers that
offer a broad portfolio of wines has caused wineries to look for brand alliances
and acquisitions. Much of the strength behind retailers’ actions has come from
consumers who have reduced their wine purchases of wines consumed away-
from-home in favor of at-home consumption. Walker (1999) indicated that the
U.S. suppliers, such as Canandaigua (the second largest supplier in the U.S.), are
acquiring wine brands, such as Simi Winery and Franciscan to expand their
portfolios. These acquisitions provide access to a greater variety of wines and
winegrape sources, and allow sales and distribution networks to be more fully
utilized.
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to note that Gallo holds less than a two-percent share of the world market. Yet by
volume it is the world’s largest wine supplier, and it accounts for nearly half the
wine exports from the U.S. (Geene et al., 1999; and Sawyer, 1997). These ﬁgures
highlight the fragmented nature of world markets, in which no ﬁrm’s national
inﬂuence extends much beyond its own nation’s borders. This lends a sense of
contestability to world wine markets, even if some national markets are led by a
few ﬁrms.
In summary, world wine markets face a number of changes including increased
acceptance of New World wines, changes in consumer preferences, and increased
competition within quality wine categories, and increased retail-level inﬂuence
that appears to heighten winery efforts to consolidate. These same factors are
apparent in the U.S. wine market. However, because of the U.S. market’s growth
and openness, U.S. wineries may be especially sensitive to changes in world
markets.
THE U.S. WINE MARKET
Although U.S. wine production represents 43% of New World production and 8%
of the world’s wine production, the U.S. share of world exports, in 1997, was
about four percent. Two reasons account for this small share. First, unlike other
major wine markets growth in the U.S. wine market kept U.S. wineries focussed
on their domestic markets. Export markets, for most U.S. wineries, were viewed
as destinations for “surplus” production. Second, development of export markets
has been limited by slow growth in foreign consumer markets, and consistent
marketing efforts by non-U.S. wineries competing in foreign markets.
Among the major wine-consuming nations, the U.S., through the 1990’s, was
considered an attractive import market. Though U.S. wine consumption per capita
was eight times lower than that of leading wine-consuming nations, relative
growth in the U.S. market exceeded growth in wine markets around the world.
The U.S. market’s status as a premier wine growth market was the result of a
favorable combination of afﬂuence, demographic and lifestyle factors, and
absence of substantial social or religious prohibitions. These factors made the U.S.
market attractive to both domestic and foreign wine marketers.
As shown in Table 1, U.S. wine exports equaled 2.3 million hectoliters in 1997.
This export level represented a 22% increase in volume in the last ﬁve years,
which helped U.S. wineries increase the value of wine exports by 23%. In 1997,
almost half the U.S. wine exports were sold in the European Union and
Switzerland; about 30% were sold in Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean; and
Asia (primarily Japan and Hong Kong) accounted for the remainder.
Bottled (3.7 million hectoliters) and bulk (500,000 hectoliters) wine imports
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However, as noted by Cartiere (1997) and Sawyer (1997), many U.S. wineries
used bulk and bottled imports to supplement their domestic offerings in an effort
to maintain shelf-space. This substitution also enabled U.S. wineries to continue
shipping domestically produced quality wines to export markets. This action
represented a signiﬁcant response by U.S wineries that were often criticized by
foreign marketers because they previously abandoned export markets and mar-
keting efforts when U.S. supplies were limited. Despite the marketing ﬂexibility
provided by bulk and bottled wine imports, some U.S. winemakers feared that the
distinction between U.S. and foreign wines would blur for U.S. consumers, and
the U.S. wine industry would suffer. However, this blurring may no be due as
much to import inroads as it is to U.S. consumers who, for the most part, do not




This study followed an interview approach recently used by Vaughan, Malanoski,
West, and Handy (1994), Hagen (1996), and Solana-Rosillo and Abbott (1998) in
which food industry executives were interviewed about their ﬁrms’ foreign
investments. The Wines & Vines 1997 Buyer’s Guide was used to identify
industry executives at the nation’s thirty largest wine companies. The 30-winery
set was used because contained all the U.S. wineries that had known and
signiﬁcant foreign direct investments.
Twenty-six percent of the executives contacted (representing 20% of U.S. wine
production) participated in the survey interviews either in person or by telephone.
The remaining 80% refused or were otherwise unavailable during the year-long
study period. In addition to industry executives, wine industry consultants,
government ofﬁcials, and wine magazine editors were also interviewed about their
knowledge of U.S. wineries FDI. The following discussion of FDI motivations is
based on interviews with eight wine industry executives, and six industry
“observers” (consultants, editors, and government ofﬁcials). The comments of
staff members who participated in the interviews were included as part of the
“leader’s” response.
All interviews followed a question script that allowed respondents to expand on
any issues raised in the interview. A copy of this script is contained in the
Appendix. As expected, industry leaders acknowledged the potential inﬂuence of
most motive categories, but they often emphasized the importance of different
motives and offered differing rationales about the inﬂuence of speciﬁc factors.
The interview results were distilled by ﬁrst categorizing responses into general
54 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 1/1999motive categories. Discussions about the inﬂuence of speciﬁc factors or differing
explanations about the inﬂuence of factors are presented in the next section only
if two or more leaders addressed similar issues. The interview results are
presented in order of frequency of stated importance starting with the most
frequently mentioned motivation category. Given the qualitative nature of this
analysis, no statistical signiﬁcance is implied by the order in which the
motivations are presented.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Given previously mentioned world and U.S. wine market shifts, U.S. wineries’
foreign investment decisions are heavily inﬂuenced by resource access, quality
control, and production cost considerations. The increasing standardization of
wines within speciﬁc quality/price point wine categories has placed pressure on
wineries to differentiate themselves less on wine characteristics and more on
product availability (portfolio breadth), consistency, and marketing transactions
costs. This evolving aspect of the U.S. wine market, and wine markets elsewhere,
is perhaps the most signiﬁcant force promoting U.S. wine industry FDI from a
supply chain perspective.
Resource Seeking Motives
Interviews with industry leaders suggested that production ﬂexibility and
access to varietal supplies were the primary motivations for foreign investments
by U.S. wineries. Investment decisions were based on each winery’s assessment
of gaps in its current wine portfolio. As a result, not all U.S. wineries with the
ﬁnancial capacity to invest in foreign markets did so. Executives who did not
invest overseas typically believed their wineries possessed three competitive
advantages. First, they had access to a stable and adequate supply of domestically
produced winegrapes. Second, they felt they could control the cost of domesti-
cally supplied winegrapes (within given quality levels). Finally, they determined
that they offered a sufﬁciently competitive wine portfolio.
Marketing and natural resource access motivations were most often raised as
signiﬁcant factors in wineries’ investment decisions. Increased “marketing inﬂu-
ence” tied to the desire to “lock-in” sources was an important component of many
wineries’ investment considerations. Some executives felt that if they created an
import division, they would then need to protect their sources of wine and closely
control wine and grape quality. Supply and quality control were considered
critical. In some cases, wineries that had experienced previous problems associ-
ated with imported wines were less likely to trust the effectiveness of contractual
obligations designed to ensure import quality and timeliness of deliveries.
Most industry observers and winery executives maintained that foreign-
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of their winery’s core group of products. However, in cases where the winery was
expanding into a price range or augmenting its portfolio, then foreign wines were
offered as a least-cost means for that expansion. No winery executive felt that
foreign wines were used to bargain for lower domestic winegrape prices.
Nevertheless, the indirect role which access to foreign sources could play in
mitigating future price pressures was not entirely discounted.
Strategic Motives
Some industry leaders saw U.S. winery FDI actions as a response to worries
about the heavy competition in Chardonnay, Merlot, and Cabernet Sauvignon
markets (three of the most recognizable wine varietals marketed in the U.S.). They
also asserted that U.S. investments served to increase wine consumers’ respect
and reduce their quality concerns about wines from other regions. The recent
shortages of U.S. wines allowed recognizable wines (e.g., Chardonnay and
Merlot) from New World producers to establish sound reputations in the
marketplace and within the industry. The beneﬁts of utilizing rather than ﬁghting
against imports were noted by several industry leaders.
Even without limited U.S. wine supplies, the reputations of some New World
producers continue to grow. Hochstein (1999) noted that several Chilean and
Argentine wines compete well in both quality and great wine categories. Not
surprisingly, some of these wines are products of alliances and foreign invest-
ments between European and South American ﬁrms, as well as ventures between
U.S. and South American ﬁrms.
Firm Size Motives
Firm size was considered an important threshold factor by all industry leaders.
However, the reasons provided for the importance of size varied among
executives. Some observers felt that large “corporate” wine companies had
developed broad infrastructures and distribution channels through which cost
advantages could be achieved only by moving high volumes of wines or other
beverages. “Corporate” ﬁrms in this category (e.g., Gallo, and Canandaigua) were
occasionally described as having an “order-taker mentality” that focused on
marketing volume over quality, if that choice had to be made. Nonetheless, these
ﬁrms are positioned to beneﬁt from retailers’ supply chain initiatives because they
possess effective distribution systems, focus on cost, and are actively creating or
acquiring wine brands that expand their wine portfolios.
Intangible and Tangible Advantage Motives
Larger ﬁrms typically were also considered better endowed with tangible and
intangible assets that could offset a signiﬁcant amount of the uncertainty and risks
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ﬁrms wanted to increase production ﬂexibility and reduce the risk of not having
sufﬁcient access to markets or resources. This motivation supported the produc-
tion-ﬂexibility notion that ﬁrms determined domestic and foreign capacity ex ante,
but made production decisions ex post. This was an advantage that only larger
wineries could afford. Other observers disclosed that size was important because
of the cost associated with managing investments overseas, and because larger
ﬁrms were more likely to attract the managerial and technical talent needed to
make the foreign investment a success.
An assessment of the sizes of the wineries that have undertaken foreign
investments (according to published reports), reveals that ﬁrm size is positively
related to FDI. Kendall Jackson (Argentina, Italy, France, and Chile), Mondavi
(Italy, France, and Chile), Wente (Mexico), and Beringer (France and Chile) all
have production capacities exceeding 100,000 hectoliters (Cartiere, 1997; Groves,
1996; and Sawyer, 1997).
As noted earlier, ﬁrms’ perceptions of their access to winegrapes and their
perceived lack of control over resources affected their investment decisions, as did
higher transactions costs associated with doing business in arm’s-length markets.
Vulnerability and strategic considerations were, in varying degrees, considered
important motivations by most industry executives and observers participating in
our study, though no executive used the term “vulnerable.” The concentration and
increased competition from domestic and foreign sources heightened some
wineries’ perceived need for additional wine volume.
Technology and Control Motives
All industry leaders and observers agreed that research and development were
not considered signiﬁcant investment factors. Winery executives felt that wineries
around the world had access to similar winemaking technologies. Thus, emphasis
was not placed on technology, but rather the application and choice of technol-
ogies used. The desire to control quality from the vineyard to the bottle varied
among wineries, but all recognized that grape quality was the primary factor in
determining wine quality and consistency from year to year.
The point at which wineries typically chose to exercise control over the
winemaking process was an additional consideration. Wine executives who
believed that grape quality was paramount typically chose to invest in vineyards
and wineries. Those who considered their vineyard contracts, or other relation-
ships, to be strong were less likely to become involved in grape production. Those
executives who viewed wine making as a complicated blend of art and science
pointed to this perception as a primary reason for the preference of direct
investments by U.S. wineries. Speciﬁcally, the technical design and aesthetic
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infrequent inspections, or other poorly timed interactions.
The means by which U.S. wineries enter foreign investment differs across
companies. The preference of speciﬁc host-country investment strategies is
heavily path dependent (Graham, 1996). That is, the respective history and
philosophy of the wineries affect the location of their investments, their choice of
joint venture partners (if any), and how much control they maintain over their
investments. The FDI approaches used by Mondavi are prime examples of path
dependence because of that winery’s preference for ventures with the “elite”
families of a targeted wine region.
Trade Barriers and Political Motives
Trade barriers (both tariff and nontariff) and exchange rate motivations for
foreign investments were not cited in the interviews as major factors in U.S. wine
industry foreign investments. Given that no unconditionally attractive consumer
wine markets exist in wine-producing nations where investments took place, the
desire to bypass trade barriers was not great. This ﬁnding was no doubt inﬂuenced
by the practice of importing wines into the U.S. to maintain domestic markets and
enable U.S. wine export efforts to be sustained.
Finally, several industry leaders noted that misgivings about political stability
in certain wine-producing nations (e.g., Moldova and South Africa) limited U.S.
winery investments despite apparent agricultural advantages. In those cases,
concerns about the macro-environment overshadowed consideration of potential
gains from increased access to winegrape resources, and promoted a “wait-and-
see” investment outlook.
CONCLUSIONS
The FDI motivations of U.S. winery executives coincide closely with motivations
found in the literature on FDI. However, the dominant wine industry motivations
are heavily inﬂuenced by world and U.S. wine market factors rather than by some
universal set of investment considerations. Two essential elements appear to
characterize the environment in which U.S. winery investment decisions are
made. First, world wine market preferences have shifted toward quality wines, but
are less restrictive with respect to wine origin. Second, U.S. wineries concentrate
on access to adequate supplies of quality winegrapes, and access to consumers’
market baskets, which includes the needs of supermarkets and wholesalers that
increasingly serve as the primary links between wineries and consumers. The
inﬂuence of supply chain management considerations is critical in this setting, and
the investment decisions of U.S. wineries can be viewed as management reactions
in those considerations.
58 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 1/1999U.S. winery executives and industry observers interviewed in this study all
reﬂected on how the industry’s focus has shifted from the world’s recent and
observable excess supply of wine to concerns about adequate supplies of quality
winegrapes and competition from new producing sources. New entrants seeking
to capture market share, especially in the United States, have placed pressure on
existing market participants. This perceived vulnerability to regions with consis-
tent quality and lower production costs was a common investment motivation.
The signiﬁcance of this motivation rested partly on the ability of a ﬁrm to sense
or assess changes in the industry that threaten its position in the market, and partly
on the ﬁrm’s assessment of its ability to internalize tangible and intangible assets.
The presence of price distortions across production stages and the desire to
internalize transactions also served to motivate ﬁrms’ investments. However,
investment decisions also were motivated by more aggressive strategic consider-
ations of wineries that used FDI to integrate international operations, expand
demand, and reduce supply risks.
NOTE
1. New World producers are deﬁned as wine producers who operate outside the
classic Western European core of winemaking regions.
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APPENDIX
Motivations for Foreign Direct Investment by U.S. Wine Industry
Initial Questions
If a winery was involved in or considering any foreign investments then the
following questions were asked:
1. How many investments?
2. Where is each investment?
3. What is the nature of the investment? (Joint venture, wholly owned subsidiary,
etc.)
4. What were the primary motivations for each foreign investment?
5. What factors affected the location of each investment?
6. Were production costs a factor?
7. Was access to foreign market demand a factor?
8. Were domestic market production or consumption constraints a factor?
9. Were tariff or nontariff barriers a factor?
10. Were exchange rate ﬂuctuations a factor?
11. What concerns (political, market, business relationship, etc.) did your com-
pany have as it entered into each investment?
12. How important are export sales to your company’s ﬁnancial future?
International Investment Motivations of U.S. Wineries 6113. How do you think each foreign investment will affect your company’s U.S.
exports?
If the winery had not invested and did not intend to invest, the following
questions along with questions6-1 3from above were asked:
14. What were the primary motivations for not engaging in foreign investments?
15. What factors would need to change before you considered foreign investment
opportunities?
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